INTRODUCTION
In 2001 Madagascar stepped back from the brink of probable civil war. The country's new leader, President Marc Ravalomanana, seemed poised to pave the way for long-term stability and economic prosperity. The international community provided widespread support as prospects appeared to improve, but Ravalomanana had built his power on fragile foundations. In the years that followed, opposition grew from key economic, military, and political stakeholders, and, by late 2008, Ravalomanana's power base began to unravel. A series of disturbing events ensuedincluding a mutiny at an army barracks and the massacre of civilians by presidential security forces on the main square in the capital, Antananarivo-precipitating a political crisis that continued through late 2010. By that time, international donors had largely suspended their non-humanitarian assistance.
Madagascar is a deeply impoverished country. In the absence of financial support from and oversight by the international community, the 'transition' government is signing unfavourable contracts, primarily with Chinese and other Asian investors, who are gaining unchecked access to the island's wealth of resources. The extraction and transportation of these resources-including timber, seafood, beef and rare animal species, coal, uranium, gold, diamonds, and other precious stones-allegedly relies on the tacit cooperation and collusion of members of the country's security forces. Moreover, rates of armed robbery, often committed with military weapons, appear to have risen sharply since 2008, as has the presence of international criminal networks. Research suggests that these networks are taking advantage of the political disarray to turn Madagascar into a hub for regional and global trafficking-predominantly of drugs.
Madagascar's security sector has always been weak, undermined by external influence and, since independence in 1960, instrumentalized by successive heads of state and their entourages. As a result, the military, gendarmerie, and police forces do not constitute effective units with a clear vocation; instead, the regular forces are severely underpaid while a hugely inflated number of high-ranking officers are pursuing their own political and economic agendas.
Combined with Madagascar's strategic location, lack of basic infrastructure, difficult terrain, and porous borders (see Map 6 .1)-which attract predatory actors who plunder the natural resources and engage in illegal trafficking-a dysfunctional security sector has generated the conditions for armed violence of worrisome proportions.
This chapter offers an analysis of Madagascar's insecurity, with a special focus on the role of security sector actors.
Policy-makers and researchers have largely ignored the fragile relationships between the Malagasy state and its security forces and between political stability and economic predation. Information on these topics is extremely limited and fragmentary, often historically inaccurate, and frequently contradictory. To offer a critical and more coherent perspective on political violence on the island, the United Nations Office of the Resident Coordinator in Madagascar commissioned a Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment in early 2010; the study built on nearly 200 key informant interviews, background papers, and a preliminary survey of security perceptions in Antananarivo and environs (Jütersonke and Kartas, 2010) . This chapter draws on all of the source material developed for that assessment as well as additional desk and in-country research.
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This chapter's principal conclusions include the following:
• To a large extent, Madagascar's inability to develop effective state security forces can be attributed to its colonial heritage and strategic location. As a result, the main rationale for a career in the military or gendarmerie is the pursuit of personal gain.
• Since their politicization and instrumentalization in the 1970s, Madagascar's armed forces have constantly been embroiled in struggles over political power and economic access to the country's wealth of resources.
• Today, Madagascar's security sector is characterized by severely underpaid and ill-equipped regular forces, far too many high-ranking officers, and a mushrooming of special intervention units with questionable mandates.
• Collusion between elements of the country's security sector and both foreign and domestic business interests has sharply intensified since the political crisis of early 2009. In the resulting security vacuum, armed criminality is on the rise, rural banditry has expanded, and Madagascar is gaining in importance as an international trafficking hub.
• The state administration has encouraged the organization of neighbourhood watch initiatives and village self-defence groups; it has also turned a blind eye to the operations of highly aggressive indigenous private security companies that hunt down rural bandits.
The chapter has two main sections. The first section reviews the historical context and development of the security sector in Madagascar, noting the specific ways in which the armed forces have continuously been subject to strategies of dispersion and co-optation by colonial and post-colonial governments. Not only has this process led officers to abuse their positions in the pursuit of personal gain, but it has also transformed Madagascar's armed forces into pawns of predatory actors seeking to further their own political and economic agendas. The second section analyses the sources of current political instability and the dynamics of today's dysfunctional security sector. It considers three main types of insecurity: armed criminality, large-scale rural banditry, and international trafficking networks on the island. In so doing, it focuses on the role of state security actors either in failing to prevent insecurity or in perpetuating it.
FROM COLONY TO COUNTRY: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Madagascar's political process and its administrative, societal, and economic institutions and practices were all shaped by the impact of colonial politics on traditional society. Yet while Madagascar is thus a classic 'imported state' (Badie, 2000) , the island features a series of structural particularities. In fact, Madagascar's plight cannot be grasped without an understanding of the historical dynamics that have led to the blurring of national interest and private benefit-and, ultimately, to the country's dysfunctional security sector.
The emergence and co-option of a politico-military elite
In the later decades of the 19 th century, the Imerina Kingdom-and its people, the Merina-conquered roughly threequarters of the Great Island and rose from a small 'principality' to become the isle's imperial master (Allen, 1987, p. 135 ).
This rise to power was the result of an alliance between the royalty and resourceful hova family clans that had helped to finance the king's war. In return, successive kings and queens had provided the clans with forced labour and a regulatory system to build irrigated rice fields and marketplaces. Crucially, the military expansion of the Imerina Kingdom depended on trade: the export of rice and slaves and the import of textiles and firearms. France encountered Imerina dominance when it invaded the island and subsequently took control of Antananarivo in 1895. The hova plutocrats had effective control over a highly repressive kingdom that had 'colonized' the other people of the Great Island through merciless forced labour and the slave trade. Thus, the French colonizers sought to 'pacify'
an island experiencing constant anti-hova insurgencies and civil strife on the one hand, and worked to contain the th century As the Imerina kings and queens unify the island with the help of the British, thousands of people lose their lives in a series of rebellions and resistance movements from rival kingdoms and chieftaincies (Razafindranaly, 2000; Rasamoelina, 2007; Stadelmann, 2009 ).
1890s Following the two Franco-Malagasy wars (1883-85 and 1895) and the establishment of a French protectorate, Gen. Joseph Gallieni is sent to Madagascar in 1896 to 'pacify' the island based on his experience in Indochina. The insurgency ends in 1898 with more than 50,000 dead from the fighting and related famine and disease (Covell, 1995, p. 141; Rabinow, 1995) .
1940s Malagasy nationalism and calls for self-government surge again in the 1940s. The resulting crackdown by the colonial administration in March 1947-and the subsequent state of emergency upheld until 1956-lead to a death toll that continues to be contested to this day, with estimates ranging from 11,200 to 100,000 people (Deschamps, 1972, p. 269; Covell, 1995, p. 212) .
1971
The gendarmerie, headed by Col. Richard Ratsimandrava, ruthlessly crushes a regional revolt over tax collection with the support of the prime minister's Israeli-trained Force Républicaine de Sécurité (Republican Security Force, FRS). Between 500 and 1,000 people are reportedly killed. Famously, the Malagasy armed forces decline to participate in the operations (Schraeder, 1994; Rakotomanga, 1998; Archer, 1976, p. 49) .
1972 In response to student protests, the FRS raids the University of Madagascar, sparking the May Revolution. Once again, the FRS fires into the crowd at the Hôtel de Ville in Antananarivo, while the gendarmerie and army refuse to shoot at the demonstrators (Rakotomanga, 1998; Althabe, 1980) . power of the plutocrats on the other. By co-opting the kingdom's administrative structure, France adopted a divideand-rule strategy between the Merina, emblematic of hova domination, and the people from the coastal regions (the so-called côtiers), thereby emphasizing ethnic differences between them (Deschamps, 1972, pp. 244-47; Allen, 1987, p. 137; Rajoelina, 1988) .
The Merina hova, who began organizing themselves politically to restore their dominance and oust the new colonial power, expressed their claims in nationalistic terms. In contrast, the emerging 'non-hova' middle class (côtiers and less privileged Merina and Betsileo) placed their support behind the French, whose rule was less repressive than the Imerina Kingdom's had been and provided some opportunity for social and economic advancement.
The 1947 insurgency provided France with the opportunity to weaken Malagasy aspirations for independence (see Box 6.1). The colonial administration supported pro-French political forces for a future transfer of power but relied on Merina and Betsileo officers for the build-up of indigenous forces (Razafindranaly, 2000, p. 253) . From the French perspective, with the election of Philibert Tsiranana, a côtier teacher, as president of the First Republic and the parallel consolidation of the Parti Social Démocrate (Social Democratic Party, PSD), the necessary conditions for maintaining a neo-colonial regime after independence had been met. 'Kung Fu' movement attack a state-run youth association that was widely believed to have been involved in street crime and informing the security police about political dissidents. President Didier Ratsiraka's security forces launch an attack on the movement, killing the leader, Pierre-Michel Andrianarijoana, and several hundred members .
1991 After fraudulent elections in 1989 and 1991, students initiate a new protest movement. On 10 August 1991, more than 400,000 people participate in the 'Great March' towards Ratsiraka's presidential palace. When the crowd reaches the 'red zone' around the palace, members of the presidential guard opened fire, killing about 130 people (Covell, 1995, p. xliv) .
2001
The presidential candidates-Ratsiraka and the mayor of Antananarivo, entrepreneur Marc Ravalomanana-accuse each other of election fraud. Ratsiraka responds by blockading the capital along the roads linking the highlands to the coastal regions. Both sides supply reservists and civilian supporters with weapons, and several hundred people are killed in episodic clashes along the blockade over a six-month period (Rakotomanga, 2004, pp. 66-67; Vivier, 2007, pp. 60-65) . Neo-colonial foundations of the security sector
Madagascar did not gain independence through armed struggle, and there was no liberation army to unite popular sentiments. Instead, the basic structure of the security forces of the First Republic were those inherited from the colonial system-in particular, the tripartite system of army, gendarmerie, and police (Rakotomanga, 1998, p. 12; see Box 6.2) . Moreover, according to the cooperation agreement, France continued to guarantee Madagascar's external defence and internal security (Covell, 1995, p. 73) . In the state administration, French technical assistants still played a key role; in the military, they continued to be the dominant force.
At the time of independence in 1960, Madagascar had only ten Malagasy officers, all of whom had previously been active in the French armed forces; two of them had trained at the famous St. Cyr academy. Practically all of them were drawn from Merina aristocrats or hova families. 2 Tsiranana kept the defence portfolio under the control of the presidential office and appointed the then highest ranking officer, Gabriel Ramanantsoa (a descendant of the royal family), as head of the joint staff, with the task of organizing the military (Rakotomanga, 1998, pp. 12, 32, 39 Bocchino and placed hierarchically above the army's joint staff (Rakotomanga, 1998, pp. 34-37) . At the time, the gendarmerie was a much-feared tool of French colonial oppression, serving as the main security and policing force with the broadest coverage of the territory (Razafindranaly, 2000, pp. 253-57) . Its soldiers were thus hardly trained to perform regular policing duties, a fact that continues to haunt Madagascar's security system today (Milburn, 2004) .
French technical assistants continued to be present at all levels, especially in the president's special staff. Two factors explain 
Box 6.2 State security actors in Madagascar
Not only did Madagascar inherit the French political system of presidential republicanism, but it was also bestowed with the French security triad of the army, the gendarmerie, and the police, which remains in place today. The Malagasy Army (Armée Malgache) churns out enough highranking officers per year to cater to an army of several hundred thousand soldiers (Rakotomanga, 2004, p. 71) , 5 far more than its 12,500 troops actually need (IISS, 2009, p. 309) . Although Madagascar is an island, it has no navy, no functioning air force, and its battalions are built around materiel (such as tanks and artillery) that the country happened to acquire, rather than on what it needs to fulfil its operational functions. In practice, a career in the military is seen as a path to social status, political influence, and personal self-enrichment.
As is the case in France, the national gendarmerie (Gendarmerie Nationale) in Madagascar constitutes a branch of the armed forces that is tasked not with the defence of the country against external attack but with the maintenance of law and order-predominantly in rural areas. Yet, unlike in France (or Italy), there is no effective system of civilian oversight or, consequently, public accountability. The gendarmerie is characterized by an inflated proportion of highranking officers, a meddling in domestic politics, and entrepreneurial enrichment-as is the army. The 8,100 gendarmes are ultimately an ineffective service of public order on the island's vast territory (IISS, 2009, p. 309 ).
Madagascar's national police (Police Nationale), by contrast, has generally tried to distance itself from the political scene. That aim, however, is hampered by the fact that its directeur général is, together with his counterparts from the army and the gendarmerie, subordinate to the Mixed National Operational Joint Staff (Etat-major mixte opérationnel national, EMMONAT). It is further undermined by the gendarmerie's insistence on having a substantial presence in the island's urban centres. The result is direct competition among security services, rather than effective collaboration. 6 Since the events of 2009, the theoretical division of labour in the triad has been undermined further with the creation of the Special Intervention Forces (Forces d'intervention spéciales, FIS) by the current transitional head of state, Andry Rajoelina. Composed of elements from the military and the gendarmerie, the FIS was supposedly tasked with combating rural banditry (Madagascar Tribune, 2009) . In reality, the FIS has become a prominent actor in urban centres, notably the capital, where it is perceived as a security arm of the Rajoelina regime. Crucially, the existence of the FIS has not led to a reduction in the multitude of special forces operating in Madagascar. Instead, it constitutes another instance of an unconstitutional arrangement set up to reward officers who were instrumental in Rajoelina's coming to power (Rajaofera, 2010a) .
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major access point for weapon supplies in the so-called Frontline States, which were supporting nationalist movements such as the South West Africa People's Organization in Namibia, the African National Congress in South Africa, and the two Zimbabwe African National Union factions (Verrier, 1986; Leys, 1995) . Recognizing Madagascar's strategic position, external and internal forces alike actively impeded the armed forces from evolving into an effective and independent entity (Allen, 1987, pp. 145, 152-53; Milburn, 2004) . This containment resulted in one of the most striking features of Madagascar's armed forces: the complete lack of a navy or operational coast guard. Indeed, even today, Madagascar's armed forces are not equipped for (or even reflect strategically about) defence of the territory from external threats (Jütersonke and Kartas, 2010, p. 68) .
In short, the neo-colonial character of Madagascar's security sector not only undermined the formation of accountable, disciplined, and independent forces, but also sowed the seeds of division between Merina notables and côtiers aspirants. 7 Since the 1960s, internal disunity and external influence have been the fundamental characteristics of Madagascar's armed forces, exposing the army and gendarmerie to instrumentalization and co-option and, ultimately, transforming them into pawns in a political power struggle (Rakotomanga, 2004, pp. 71-84; 1998, p. 116; ). (Allen, 1987, p. 162) . The armed forces became highly politicized as a result (Archer, 1976, pp. 58-60) . (Archer, 1976, p. 155 ). Yet, despite all his rhetoric about socialist revolution and civilian government, Ratsiraka, who had come to power thanks to the armed forces, feared that a military coup would be his ultimate downfall if the top brass were not pleased with the benefits they accrued from his rule. Indeed, an effective separation of the armed forces from the civilian state administration would have forced many officers to return to their normal military functions and (lower) salaries, a change they wanted to avoid at all costs (Rakotomanga, 1998, p. 90 ).
9
As a result, Ratsiraka did not opt for civilian oversight of the armed forces but sought to control the military through dispersion. Proclaiming himself 'admiral' in 1983, 10 he followed a three-pronged strategy to rid his presidency of any contestation of his rule from the ranks of the military (Rabenirainy, 2002, pp. 90-92) . The first consisted of a 'banalization' of the military establishment through a redefinition of the armed forces as 'militants in uniform' fighting for the socialist cause. The second entailed a major restructuring of the army into three new joint staffs (état-majors), all of which had a primarily domestic orientation. 11 A general joint staff within the presidential office superseded these joint staffs, and a defence ministry was created simultaneously-but without clear lines of command or accountability.
Ratsiraka's third strategy involved caring for the long-term careers of his high-ranking officers, who received high posts in the military development committee, the national revolutionary council, the state administration, and the nationalized enterprises. Indeed, a National Military Office for Strategic Industries (Office militaire national pour les industries stratégiques, OMNIS) was set up for this purpose, and officers deemed potentially subversive were sent for training to the Soviet Union and North Korea, the new 'cooperation partners' (Galibert, 2009, p. 80; Rabenirainy, 2002, p. 91 (Rakotomanga, 1998, p. 90; Gow, 1997, pp. 417, 425) . In contrast, rural areas-characterized by numerous zones rouges (red zones) to which the security forces had no access due to a lack of transportation and road networksremained severely under-patrolled. The paradox of rising insecurity in a bloated police state reflected the highly centralized administration that had lost its capacity to govern in the periphery.
A Third Republic-but still no security sector reform 1998 (Jütersonke and Kartas, 2010, pp. 46-50; Marcus, 2010, pp. 123, 128) . The reform of the security forces remained largely unaddressed.
No prerogatives were introduced for civilian leadership of the military and gendarmerie, for the separation of external defence and domestic security, or for parliamentary control of the armed forces.
Generals Désiré Ramakavelo and Marcel Ranjeva introduced a number of changes under the Zafy administration, among them a White Book, which affirmed the neutrality of the armed forces, avoided all references to 'the citizen in uniform', and defined new aims adapted to global threats. Yet all of this was lip service rather than the start of an actual process of restructuring (Rabenirainy, 2002, p. 92 ).
The dynamic businessman Marc Ravalomanana became president in 2002, vowing to reform and depoliticize the armed forces (Rakotomanga, 2004, pp. 46-47) . 13 But it was largely business as usual in the security sector. Above all, the lead-up to his presidency had placed serious doubts on the credibility of any reform pledges.
When Ravalomanana proclaimed himself victorious after a first round of elections in February 2002, Ratsiraka declared martial law, came to an agreement with five of the country's six provincial governors, and designated the port city of Toamasina provisional capital (BBC, 2002b; Vivier, 2007, pp. 48-53) . He also set up a physical blockade of Antananarivo, in what amounted to an economic embargo of the highlands (Raison, 2002, pp. 124-28) . Madagascar was on the brink of civil war.
14
The armed forces were split down the middle into Ratsiraka's loyalistes and Ravalomanana's légitimistes. Faced with a bloated officer corps and a lack of trained soldiers, each side had to resort to reservists, militias, and civilians, who received weapons and fought by proxy along the barricades (Rakotomanga, 2004, pp. 65-68; Vivier, 2007, ch. 8) . In fact, instead of constituting a usable fighting force, soldiers and gendarmes profited from the blockades and the resulting chaos by colluding with criminal gangs to loot and rob the island and residents (Rakotomanga, 2004; Raison, 2002, p. 123) .
Foreign pressure eventually prevailed, and Ravalomanana was confirmed as president, but his rhetoric in favour of democratic control of the armed forces was incompatible with his immediate need to assuage the légitimiste camp of the military to prevent a reunited army from turning against him (Rakotomanga, 2004, pp. 46, 56, 129 (Rajaofera, 2010b; ICG, 2010a, p. 6) . This section explores the major repercussions of this dynamic-armed criminality, rural banditry, and international trafficking. These troubles are not new, but they have been exacerbated by the events of 2009. The triad of a dysfunctional security sector, a lame state apparatus, and dynamic predatory actors is at the heart of these interrelated phenomena.
Armed criminality
Comprehensive crime statistics do not exist for Madagascar. Interviewed officials hint that available data is regularly manipulated when it is deemed useful for relations with the international community or to secure institutional funding for training or equipment. 19 Nevertheless, media reports and preliminary surveys suggest that the use of firearms in violent crime is on the rise (see Box 6.3). Moreover, there appears to be a high degree of under-reporting, either because victims do not contact the security forces or because the security forces are themselves directly or indirectly involved in the criminal acts committed. Indeed, interviews conducted with chefs de fokontany (elected neighbourhood representatives) in the port city of Toamasina and elsewhere paint a disturbing picture of groups of bandits wreaking havoc at night, without police intervention. This trend has led to the formation of neighbourhood watch initiativesandrimasom-pokonolona, or self-defence units-which have taken the provision of security into their own hands (Rasoanaivo, 2010 ; Express de . The scope and scale of these initiatives, however, remain unclear. In this context, it is troubling that, as one high-ranking informant exclaimed during an interview in early 2010, 'Madagascar has no security but many securities!' Indeed, today's Malagasy security forces are characterized by a dizzying array of special units geared towards muscular interventions, while the day-to-day activities of enforcing law and order-and, above all, preventing crime-are largely neglected. In the capital, the national police created a rapid intervention group, an anti-gang service, a special intervention unit, and a special intervention brigade, each with its own mandate and territorial jurisdictions. Many such entities can also be found in France, where some members of these elite corps have been trained (Midi Madagasikara, 2005; Rakotomanga, 1998; 2004) . 20 Regular forces, by contrast-be they police, gendarmerie, or army-are under-represented. As
Organès Rakotomihantarizaka, minister of internal security, pointed out in September 2010, Madagascar has one police officer for every 3,000 citizens-while the international norm is three well-equipped police officers for every 1,000 citizens (Les Nouvelles, 2010b).
The rural quagmire: zones rouges and dahalo
Insecurity in Madagascar is far more than an urban phenomenon.
Indeed, Madagascar's population is still predominantly rural, and, in the face of large-scale cattle rustling and with an increasing number of economic predators taking control of parts of the island's territory,
Box 6.3 The mismanagement of weapons stockpiles
Small arms are circulating freely in Madagascar, adding to the fragility of an already dire situation. The state's security forces undoubtedly represent one source of these weapons. A complete lack of small arms stockpile management is one of the most striking features of contemporary Madagascar's security sector. Assault rifles regularly disappear from arsenals during times of political crisis-never to be returned, as was the case when reservists and militia forces were armed in 1991 and 2002 and, again, according to confidential interviews, during the events of 2009 (Rakotomanga, 2004, p. 69; Hauge, 2005, p. 14; Rabako, 2010, p. 14) . Interviews conducted with members of the military, gendarmerie, and police corroborate media reports that many officers rent out firearms while off duty to supplement low salaries. Indeed, a recent investigation undertaken by the gendarmerie reportedly found proof of such misconduct (Les Nouvelles, 2010a). The incidence of armed robbery appears to be on the rise. Media reports compiled for this study reveal that, during the month of May 2010, attacks with firearms made up around two-thirds of all crimes reported, constituting an increase of more than 40 per cent compared to the previous year. Yet while automatic pistols and assault rifles are reportedly being used in criminal activities, the majority of arms being seized by custom officials at Toamasina, Madagascar's largest port, are hunting rifles (Rabako, 2010, p. 14) . Given Antananarivo's thriving black market for small arms-where anything from a revolver to an AK-47 can be bought or rentedallegations over the widespread involvement of current and former members of the state's security sector appear quite credible (Rabako, 2010, p. 15; Andriamarohasina, 2010b; Midi Madagasikara, 2010) . According to confidential sources, more than 1,500 permits for civilian firearms have been issued in the inner city of Antananarivo alone, with eligibility criteria becoming less, rather than more, stringent.
rural communities are the ones suffering most from the current lawlessness. While the gendarmerie and specially designed military units are operating in rural areas, they may be poorly equipped, lack means of transportation, or even collude with attackers.
Regularly undermined by spontaneous roadblocks, the routes nationales have become so unsafe that travel along certain sections is now only permitted in a convoy that is escorted by the gendarmerie; bus passengers are prohibited from using their mobile phones, in order to avoid tip-offs (Andriamarohasina, 2010a) .
It is remarkable to what extent Madagascar
continues to present an inhospitable terrain for any force trying to patrol and control it.
These zones rouges encompass large areas of territory that are inaccessible to security personnel. Providing disaster relief is thus extremely difficult for the Malagasy state apparatus, with famines breaking out in the south of the island and cyclones hitting the eastern shoreline with devastating regularity. 21 But even on a day-to-day basis, Madagascar's topography, coupled with a fragmented road network of dirt tracks that is unusable during the rainy season, makes the provision of rural security a daunting affair. The most persistent source of insecurity continues to be the dahalo, the Malagasy word for bandit, typically used to designate the rustlers of zebu, the local hump-backed cattle.
While cattle theft is a crime punishable by severe penalties, 22 dahalo raids are a daily occurrence in many parts of the country. A 2001 survey on insecurity in rural areas estimated that 1.78 zebus were being stolen per week per commune; extrapolating that figure to Madagascar's 1,392 communes yields almost 130,000 stolen zebus per year (Programme ILO, 2003, p. 2) . In 2006, 3,668 cases of cattle theft were brought before penal courts created specifically to deal with dahalo activities (Ignace, 2010) . More recent media reports suggest raiding has increased further since the crisis of 2009. In the region of Mahajanga alone, media accounts have documented more than 160 dahalo attacks, with more than 3,000 zebus stolen between May and July 2010. It also appears increasingly likely that the dahalo phenomenon involves collusion with elements of the armed forces and international organized crime (Madagascar Tribune, 2010 ).
23
A one-year-old famine victim cries at a feeding centre in Amboasary, southern Madagascar, 1992 . Famine continues to haunt parts of the island in 2011. © Alexander Joe/AFP Photo Some have sought to downplay the importance of the dahalo by arguing that their activities constitute a ritualized form of cattle raiding that has been part and parcel of certain regions of Madagascar for centuries-similar to the practices observed with the Karimajong in northern Uganda. Indeed, studies have shown that for the Bara people in the south of the island, the stealing of zebu belonged to a complex system of reciprocal village rituals to channel aggression, secure the rite of passage from boy-to manhood, and fulfil the preconditions for marriage. 24 Moreover, the dahalo phenomenon must be understood in the larger historical context and the push and pull factors explaining the rise or decline of banditry in Madagascar. The dahalo are a modern type of criminal armed group that did not emerge out of traditional rites of passage (although young men might indeed find their path into banditry through these rites); specifically, they developed as a consequence of the oppression of the population under the Imerina Kingdom and its extensive reliance on forced labour and the slave trade to consolidate its rule (Rasamoelina, 2007, pp. 64-67, 94-98) .
Today, the escalation of dahalo criminality and the resulting insecurity in rural areas is linked to the appropriation of cattle theft into a modern large-scale venture, with the capacity to launder the documentation of cattle, stock the cattle (sometimes for years) in the herds of influential and wealthy cattle owners (some have herds of more than 10,000 animals), and organize their transportation to the main harbours for trafficking (McNair, 2008, p. 16; Fauroux, 1989, p. 72) . 25 In contemporary Madagascar, cattle raiders play an important role in trafficking dynamics and the circulation of weapons on the island. The largest and most powerful dahalo groups provide assault rifles (mainly AK-47s) and ammunition to all their members (Madagascar Tribune, 2010) . They escort, in broad daylight, large herds of stolen cattle, carrying their guns openly over several hundred kilometres while crossing entire regions and provinces of the island. As many interviewees pointed out in 2010, these illiterate dahalo would not have the organizational, logistical, or financial capacity to conduct such operations without the support of influential networks reaching high into the echelons of the state administration. A new trend witnesses bandits operating in larger units of about 30 men, rather than the small groups of five to six that were common previously. They are now conducting veritable raids, taking women and children as hostages and burning down houses (Madagascar Tribune, 2010) .
The escalation of the dahalo phenomenon is emblematic of the fragmentation and co-option by economic interests of Madagascar's security sector. It seems beyond doubt that many gendarmes and soldiers accept bribes to turn a blind eye, rent out their firearms, and collaborate directly with the dahalo. (USDOS, 1990, p. 196) .
As a result, security forces are not keen on having dahalo testify in court. Such verdicts may also explain why special gendarmerie and army units, when they are sent out to hunt down dahalo, tend to gun down their targets on the spot, rather than attempting to capture them alive.
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The main impediment to substantially reducing the recurrence of cattle raids continues to be the lack of policing, investigative capacities, and means of transportation of the security forces. None of the gendarmerie outposts have helicopters or functioning four-wheel-drive vehicles at their disposal. Catching a dahalo is thus a tricky endeavour, (Stadelmann, 2009) . It has also, given its location, been a place of geo-strategic importance for numerous regional and global powers (Allen, 1987) . Spotting a foreign ship in One of the few contemporary issues facing Madagascar that has caught the attention of the global public is the rampant illegal logging of rosewood, often in the country's nature reserves. The island is blessed (or cursed) with more species of rosewood than any other place in the world, with most of them unique to the island and dozens still unnamed and in need of urgent taxonomic work-the first step in efforts to save them from extinction. The trafficking of precious woods is not a new phenomenon in Madagascar; but at no point has it reached the scale witnessed since the political crisis in early 2009. Commentators thus rightly speak of a rosewood 'massacre', with Global Witness estimating that the illegal Malagasy timber trade may be worth up to USD 460,000 per day (Global Witness, 2009; Schuurman and Lowry, 2009 ). According to the non-governmental organization Vakan'ala, 100,000 hectares of the island's forests-estimated at a total of 8.5 million hectares in 2005-are currently being lost per year (Vakan'ala, 2010; Muttenzer, 2010, p. 15) . Of greatest concern is the disappearance of the eastern rainforests, home to most of the island's endemic species of flora and fauna. According to statistics of the Food and Agriculture Organization, the annual rate of primary forest loss in Madagascar is 0.65 per cent, three times higher than in Indonesia (EIA, 2010) .
This massacre is organized, armed, and conducted with the direct and indirect collusion of elements of the current transitional regime. The trade is allegedly financed with advance payments from Chinese buyers and by loans from several international banks with branches in Antananarivo (Gerety, 2009 ). Heavily armed 'militias' are regularly reported to be operating in the rainforests, threatening park staff and villagers, and escorting the logs to makeshift ports on Madagascar's uncontrolled coastline, most notably at Vohémar (York, 2009) . The identity of these militias remains a mystery, though there was widespread consensus among individuals interviewed that members of the country's armed forces are collaborating with the exporters. One undercover investigation quotes the commander at a military post at the entrance to the Masaola Nature Reserve as saying: 'I do not work for the government. I am an independent' (GEO Magazin, 2010). In September 2010, it was reported that a foreign journalist was arrested by the police and, in the presence of rosewood traffickers, forced to delete images of timber stockpiles from his camera (Wild Madagascar, 2010) . And, in December 2010, a military truck carrying 50 rosewood logs was reportedly intercepted by police forces in the south of the island (Limbira, 2010) .
In early 2010, the environment minister, Edelin Callixte Ramiandrisoa, was cited in the media as proudly proclaiming that, in the space of just two months, the state's coffers had received MGA 30 billion (USD 15 million) from the sale of 300 containers (roughly 30,000 logs) of rosewood (Rabary-Rakotondravony, 2010). These were supposedly legal exports derived from trees that had been brought down by cyclones or taken from old, existing stocks. But the 'cyclone' currently sweeping over the island is man-made. As long as the current political impasse is not overcome, ecological impunity will reign supreme, and armed actors willing to engage in coercion and violence to protect their economic interests will continue to fuel insecurity and hollow out the state's capacity to safeguard and promote the well-being of its people. and jurisdiction between the army, gendarmerie, and police were never upheld in practice, and, instead of precisely delineated activities, the security sector became increasingly embroiled in the political and economic spheres. Indeed, the military was never tasked or equipped to perform its constitutional mandate of defending the territory from external threats. It has been confined to a purely domestic role and, in the absence of a sense of duty, personal gain became the ultimate rationale for joining and pursuing a career in the security forces. Not surprisingly, such venality has attracted-and has relied on-political and economic predators who are eager to pursue their own interests.
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A striking feature of post-independence Madagascar is that it has never been possible to address instability or public discontent through party politics. Instead, the armed forces were increasingly drawn into the void left by an ineffective polity; unprepared and internally divided, however, they lacked the discipline and unity to act as a stabilizing force. Since the politicization and instrumentalization of the armed forces, consecutive governments and the state administration have fallen prey to military careerists and the economic interests of both domestic and foreign
actors. Yet the lack of state capacity to enforce the law, to protect and guard the island's coasts, and to put an end to the continuous outflow and misuse of small arms from its arsenals has not been a major impediment to doing businesses-quite the contrary. With the current transitional government not internationally recognized, the lines between legal extraction and illicit trafficking begin to blur; when faced with charges of buying and reselling raw materials that were not extracted according to international or national regulations, foreign companies react by showing officially stamped documentation legitimizing the transaction.
Madagascar's media reports appear to intimate that the government, the security sector, and major business interests have all merged into one. The distinctions between public and private and between legal and illicit seem to have evaporated. Armed robbery, often committed with military weapons, illicit trafficking with probable state assistance, and vigilantism are increasingly common (Andriamarohasina, 2010c; Les Nouvelles, 2010c) . Meanwhile, the armed forces are prospering. To celebrate 50 years of independence in June 2010, Rajoelina raised the retirement age for the armed forces by a year, giving its top brass an additional bonus (Ranjalahy, 2010) . In December 2010, a further 29 officers were promoted to the rank of general (Iloniaina, 2010) .
As of this writing, with a few exceptions, the majority of bilateral and multilateral development programmes remain suspended (ICG, 2010b, p. 2, n. 8) . Such work, it is said, requires a legitimate national partner. Just as in 2002, when the country was on the brink of civil war, the international community has adopted a wait-and-see strategy, sitting out the crisis and hoping for the return of an elected government so that its development cooperation can recommence.
In the meantime, abuse of power, economic predation, ecological degradation, and a suffering population continue to be the key characteristics of the world's fourth-largest island. Covell (1995, pp. 225-26) ; Prou (1987, ch. 3); Allen (1987, pp. 134, 137 
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